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The Rockefeller Archive Center‟s (RAC) holdings are vital to my dissertation titled, 
“From Artifacts to People Facts: The Archeological Origins of Middle East Area Studies,” which 
traces the origins, content, and ramifications of interwar American academic interest in the 
Middle East, showing how that knowledge was utilized during the wartime and postwar 
expansion of the U.S. sphere of influence in the Middle East. This project is not about all of 
America‟s imaginative investment, but is rather about a relatively small group of scholars who 
had an outsized influence on America‟s relationship with the region as a whole.  As U.S. 
interests expanded during and after World War II, this accumulated knowledge influenced 
governmental policies and actions, including the increased use of propaganda as a method of 
peddling influence through deception. 
After World War II, connections between the United States and the Middle East 
multiplied in myriad ways, with postwar American interests settled around conflict with the 
Soviet Union, oil, and Israel. Yet the dominant narrative of pre-1945 encounters remains focused 
on missionaries, philanthropists, and oilmen, with hardly any attention paid to interwar 
involvement. Within this narrative structure has been an emphasis on American innocence and/or 
beneficence in the region, with Middle Easterners holding favorable opinions toward the United 
States as a bulwark against British and French colonial machinations. My project will re-
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conceptualize historical understandings of American involvement in the Middle East between 
1920 and 1953. The United States government did not enter the postwar era with no experience 
in the Middle East. Rather, it leaned heavily on a small cadre of archeologists, anthropologists, 
and architects who put their cultural knowledge to political usage during World War II. These 
scholars are the progenitors of political and scholarly relations that became so prominent after 
the Second World War. 
Most scholarship on the Oriental Institute (OI) – an archeological institution established 
at the University of Chicago in 1919 – focuses on the archeological expeditions and excavations 
made by the Institute, which were financed through the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and family, 
mainly John D. Rockefeller, Jr. (JDR Jr.). Although the discoveries and work completed by the 
Oriental Institute are significant for the field of archeology, my primary concern is not with the 
discoveries that were made, but rather with the contacts that were made between the OI and local 
workers on various expeditions. During and after WWII, American scholars who were trained as 
archeologists transitioned into ethnological work, where they drew on their experiences on 
archeological digs in order to bolster their claims about Middle Easterners. Although the RAC 
does not hold significant archeological expedition reports, it does hold the administrative records 
that explain how funding was apportioned and justified. Such records are essential to 
understanding how a shift in foundational emphasis may have affected the OI‟s scholarly focus. 
A great deal has also been written about the founder and the initial driving force behind 
the OI, James Henry Breasted, but there has been less written about his successor, John A. 
Wilson. Breasted died in late 1935, so his scholarly focus never shifted from the ancient Near 
East, although he was not immune from engagement with contemporary political disputes. Due 
to decreased funding for archeological expeditions after Breasted‟s death, OI officials 
contemplated changing the OI‟s mission to incorporate more study of the contemporary Middle 
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East. For my purposes, Wilson‟s role as an analyst of contemporary culture is particularly 
important, given that he was Coordinator of Information for the Office of War Information 
during World War II. He held this government position while he was also director of the OI. His 
specific role for the U.S. government was to formulate war time propaganda and policy towards 
the Middle East. My project connects the cultural knowledge which Wilson collected during his 
expeditions in the 1920s and 1930s, with the political uses to which he put that knowledge 
during World War II. In RAC correspondence, Wilson detailed some of his thinking about the 
current state of Middle Eastern archeology, as well as the OI‟s prospects for becoming a center 
for the study of the contemporary Middle East. Such writings are revealing articulations of 
Wilson‟s desire to maintain the OI‟s relevance, as well as its funding. 
There are two ways in which the RAC‟s holdings are important to my project. The first is 
in establishing the state of American knowledge of the Middle East during the interwar period. 
As my project seeks to trace the ways in which Americans‟ experiences on archeological digs 
influenced their opinion of Middle Easterners, it is essential that I understand what it meant to be 
an archeologist during the 1920s and 1930s. Although the RAC has more information on the 
funding of the expeditions than on the actual expeditions, I have found the RAC archives 
illuminating in terms of having a clearer idea of what goals archeologists had, as well as how 
they pitched those goals to potential donors. For the purposes of this report, the experiences of 
James Henry Breasted will characterize the first, halcyon period of OI archeology. Flush with 
funds, the OI sponsored numerous expeditions, and gathered many important artifacts to display 
in its new museum in Chicago. A confluence of ample funding and a favorable political climate 
enabled Breasted, in only 15 years, to make the OI one of the preeminent archeological 
institutions in the world. 
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The second appeal of the RAC archives is to explore the process through which U.S. 
scholarly emphasis shifted from the ancient Middle East, to a desire to understand the modern 
Middle East. Occasioned most precipitously by World War II, the academic movement that 
became known as area studies had its origins in wartime attempts to understand (and 
propagandize) hostile or neutral populations. In the Middle East, there was a high concentration 
of valuable oil resources; populations seen as susceptible to German propaganda; and only a 
small number of scholars who had spent any time in the region. Those scholars, in the United 
States, were archeologists, and some of the most prominent government workers and early area 
studies proponents had links to the Oriental Institute. As the RF changed its focus to the modern 
world, it fielded proposals from a number of institutions that wished to be at the forefront of area 
studies research (and to receive generous foundation funding). The OI pitched itself as the 
institution most prepared to meet the challenge of understanding the Middle East, despite its 
longtime focus on the ancient, rather than contemporary, history of the region. Although the OI 
did not officially change its research focus, the process of considering the change reveals a great 
deal about it meant to become a regional expert during this time period. 
In what follows, I will narrate my understanding of these two pivotal moments in the 
history of the OI in particular, and, more generally, the history of 20
th
 century American 
academic engagement with the Middle East. First, the founding, artifact-centric, exploratory 
decades of the 1920s and 1930s, and second, the post-WWII shift away from archeology as the 
principle means of scholarly encounters with the Middle East. Although I will write in general 
terms based on my overall reading of the archive, when possible I will draw from specific 
documents that illuminate a particular point. 
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JAMES HENRY BREASTED AND THE ROARING TWENTIES OF MIDDLE EASTERN ARCHEOLOGY 
The Rockefeller Archive Center holds the archival records of the founding, funding, and 
administration of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago (U of C). The OI was 
founded in 1919 through a combination of funds from John D. Rockefeller, Jr., the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the General Education Board (GEB). Funds were dispersed on an annual and ad 
hoc basis (i.e. for specific projects or acquisitions) until 1935, at which time Rockefeller officials 
outlined a process through which the OI would be permanently endowed by a series of donations 
that would be held and dispersed through the U of C. The Oriental Institute, through the generous 
(rivals said lavish) funding of the Rockefeller family and the RF and the GEB, arose from 
nothing to become one of the paramount U.S. centers for research and education in the ancient 
Near East. As described by John Wilson, Breasted‟s successor as Director, in a 1944 institutional 
history, “the first activities of the Institute were devoted to the enthusiastic assembling of 
materials.”1 Through the leadership of James Henry Breasted, the OI spearheaded a number of 
important archeological digs in the Near East, including surveys in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, 
and Syria. Wilson wrote: 
After World War I the opportunities for gathering material were so brilliant that 
collection became an urgent duty…the field opportunities had just opened up but might 
be limited in time. Dr. Breasted recognized that finances and politics might take a sudden 
turn to limit the opportunities for assembling those control materials which went into the 
making of cultural history.
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Wilson‟s account of the OI‟s initial activities was revisionist in the sense that research in the 
ancient world in the early 1920s consisted in large part of collecting objects. Although Breasted 
might have later portrayed his collecting as his way of striking while the iron was hot, in essence 
he was simply partaking in the collecting of antiquities, which was the established mode of doing 
research about the ancient world. 
6 
 
In other words, while the opportunity may have been greater at that particular moment, 
the methods were not substantially different than they had been at other times. When JDR Jr. 
agreed to fund the Oriental Institute, it was with the understanding that “material of untold value 
is now available as it has never been before.”3 While Rockefeller cited the possible destruction of 
antiquities as a reason for collecting them, with the war over, it was unclear what the present 
danger indeed was. Breasted‟s primary vision was not that the antiquities were under threat, but 
rather, he saw them as being under priced, as “for five years the Near East has seen no western 
travelers nor museum representatives, and a vast treasury of antiquities and priceless records of 
the past have accumulated awaiting the appearance of the first comers.”4 The items, however, 
were only proverbially priceless, and Breasted accordingly “secured a fund of a little over 
$16,000 to be used exclusively as a Purchase Fund in Egypt and Western Asia.”5 While he wrote 
of his desire to “save a great many invaluable records,” his main aim was to “greatly enrich the 
Chicago collections…building up…a magnificent and unrivaled body of ancient archives and 
works of early man.”6 With the permission of the British governing authority under General 
Allenby, Breasted and his cohorts secured a number of valuable pieces for the new institution.
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Breasted‟s task was greatly aided by the help and influence of the Rockefeller family, 
foundations, and even businesses. Over time, Breasted and JDR Jr. became close; when the 
Rockefeller family traveled to Egypt in 1929, Breasted was their personal tour guide. In the 
evening, after touring, JDR Jr. wrote that the family would retire to “the darkened parlor in the 
Semaramis [sic] Hotel in Cairo, listening to another of your [Breasted‟s] fascinating lectures.”8 
Their correspondence reveals a complex and intimate relationship, with JDR Jr. demonstrating 
an unshakable faith in Breasted‟s scholarship, and with Breasted returning to JDR Jr. again and 
again with funding requests for new projects and possibilities. The mixing of their personal, 
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professional, and philanthropic relations sometimes resulted in misunderstandings regarding 
funding requests. 
For instance, in 1923, as JDR Jr.‟s funding of the OI was about to expire, Breasted and U 
of C President Ernest Burton wrote him to secure additional funds for the continuation of the 
archeological enterprises. He composed a terse reply, expressing his: 
bewilderment at the assumption that the Oriental Institute was my baby, and a child to the 
continuing support of which I was permanently obligated as its father. The fact is, as you 
will see, that quite the reverse is the case. I had been called in at the birth and had agreed 
to contribute modestly for the support of the child during the first years of its life, very 
distinctly stating, however, in the third year and two years before the expiration of my 
pledge, that at the end of the fifth year period it was not in my mind to make a further 
contribution.
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Yet JDR Jr. also conceded that his correspondence had been with the previous U of C President, 
who evidently had not shared those conversations with Breasted. JDR Jr. therefore agreed to take 
up the funding request as a new contribution, and, as he would several times over the next 
decade, he committed to continue funding the OI. 
 Rockefeller family business connections also proved to be useful when the Oriental 
Institute attempted to purchase land near Luxor, Egypt, in 1929. The OI sought the land to 
establish what would come to be known as the Chicago House, a permanent base for the 
epigraphic survey of Egyptian temples and monuments. RF officers reasoned that buying the 
land directly would drive up the asking price through the association of the Rockefeller name 
with the purchase. They therefore consulted with the Vacuum Oil Company, a local affiliate of 
Standard Oil, to advance the money for the land purchase. The OI reimbursed the Vacuum Oil 
Company for at least $40,916.63 which it had spent on behalf of the OI in the land deal.
10
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examples serve to show, albeit only briefly, the multiple levels of connections between various 
Rockefeller institutions and Breasted‟s search for archeological artifacts. 
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When Breasted died, suddenly, after a return trip from the Near East in 1935, JDR Jr. was 
shaken and saddened. He wrote to Charles, one of Breasted‟s sons, “in the going of your father I 
feel that I have lost a very dear and valued friend. Few men have I found myself drawn to as 
closely as to him.”11 Yet the donor‟s relationship with the OI, and with Breasted, was already in 
the process of changing by that time. As Breasted neared 70 he had become increasingly 
cognizant of his limited time as an active scholar. Accordingly, he felt an intense pressure to 
accomplish all he could in the terms of field exploration. Despite the worldwide economic 
downturn of the Great Depression, Breasted continued, and often increased his requests for 
funding for additional projects. When an opportunity arose to buy a valuable artifact, such as 
colossal sculptures from Ninevah, in Syria; or to secure a concession at a newly opened dig site, 
for instance at Megiddo in Iran, Breasted often bypassed official RF channels, writing directly to 
JDR Jr. to request new funds.
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Breasted had learned that he could use JDR Jr.‟s personal interest in his work to get more 
money for his archeological work. I do not wish to suggest that Breasted was exploiting JDR 
Jr.‟s largesse, but Breasted had perfected his pitches to appeal to JDR Jr.‟s personal 
predilections. As Breasted wrote to U of C President Burton, “I know his [JDR Jr.‟s] interest in 
the lands which brought forth the Bible and the life of Jesus will reinforce this appeal.”13 
Breasted was rarely turned down for additional funding requests. Although JDR Jr. expressed an 
understanding for Breasted‟s requests, by 1935 he had seemingly grown fatigued by their 
frequency. He did not wish to cut off funding the OI entirely, but rather desired to make Breasted 
operate under a fixed budget, rather than continually seeking one-off money for projects. 
RF officers were less sanguine about Breasted‟s frequent requests for funding. Longtime 
officers like Charles Fahs, and newer ones like John Marshall, came to see the funding of the OI 
as falling outside the official purview of the RF. Although they continued to fund Breasted‟s 
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requests, they considered RF support of the OI to be a function of JDR Jr.‟s personal interest in 
Breasted‟s work, rather than a core focus of the RF mission. In their internal memoranda which 
considered Breasted‟s proposals, then, they became increasingly hopeful that they could lessen 
Breasted‟s year-to-year and project-to-project requests through a large, one-time bequest that 
would permanently endow the OI. 
In November 1935, JDR Jr. sent Breasted a letter that outlined the OI funding plan 
moving forward. The plan was meant to sustain the OI‟s operations through 10 yearly payments, 
with the stipulation that additional funding requests would not be considered. JDR Jr. wrote: 
The Executive Committee of the Foundation voted an appropriation for the immediate 
continuation of the work but with the very definite feeling, with which I completely 
concur, that the whole situation as regards the Oriental Institute and its many 
undertakings should be carefully reviewed at an early date with a view to the 
development of some sound and definite program for the future insofar as the Foundation 
are related thereto.
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In his roundabout, proper way, JDR Jr. expressed his desire to dissolve his relationship with the 
OI through a final grant. He continued: 
In making the contributions to the work of the Institute in the earlier years of its 
development, totaling less than $500,000, I did not for a moment assume I was putting 
myself in the position of becoming the patron of the vast enterprise that has since 
developed…in your enthusiasm you have been led to expand the scope of your operations 
far beyond what was prudent or permanently possible to maintain. I have no thought of 
making further contributions to the Oriental Institute, and much of the pleasure which I 
have had in contributing to the various specific projects which grew out of our visit to 
Egypt would have been taken away had I felt for a moment that gifts that I made from 
time to time for specific matters could be construed by you as evidences of a larger and 
more enduring interest in the whole enterprise on my part.
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JDR Jr. apparently had continued contributing to the OI past his interest, and Breasted had 
exhausted the Rockefeller largesse by his too-frequent trips to the well. 
But news of the RF‟s stance never reached James Henry Breasted. Although the message 
was dispatched to the S.S. Conte di Savoia, Breasted‟s ship, before his death, Breasted fell ill and 
died of streptococcus before ever opening the correspondence. The new age of austerity for the 
10 
 
OI was to be faced by his successor, John Wilson, who would be forced to reevaluate the OI‟s 
core mission and beliefs in light of the reduced budget. 
 
WILSON AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE 
 
 John Wilson was named the new Director of the Oriental Institute shortly after James 
Henry Breasted‟s death in 1935. Wilson, an Egyptologist who had first worked for the OI on 
their epigraphic survey of ruins near Luxor, Egypt, was a logical choice who had the support of 
OI faculty and administrators, as well as that of Rockefeller Foundation officials, and even JDR 
Jr. himself. Although the RF did not have an explicit say in such administrative decisions, clearly 
it behooved the OI to choose a leader who could maintain a productive working relationship with 
those who would fund its work. 
 Breasted was the only Director the OI had had at the time of his death. There was 
seemingly some inkling that his son, Charles, who also worked at the OI, was being groomed to 
follow his father as director. At the RF, however, Charles was viewed as a loose cannon whose 
brashness was off-putting. For example, after Charles learned of the RF‟s decision to reduce its 
funding of the OI, he wrote an embarrassing screed directly to JDR Jr. expressing his outrage and 
anger that the reduced funding meant the “Oriental Institute as conceived by my father, as a 
laboratory for the study of the rise of civilization, has ceased to exist.”16 JDR Jr. handled 
Charles‟s emotional hyperbole ably, writing to Wilson that although he had read Charles‟s letter 
“with complete sympathy and understanding…may there not be danger lest his own sense of 
disappointment and hurt…color his communications and utterances.”17 JDR Jr. understood that 
Charles was simply trying to protect his father‟s legacy, but Wilson was perceived to be a more 
prudent choice than the founder‟s impetuous son. 
 When Wilson took over the OI in 1935, as mentioned previously, his first task was to 
reevaluate the institute‟s financial positions. Whether from a change in the core mission of the 
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Rockefellers, or because of delayed-onset austerity measures as a result of the Great Depression, 
the OI going forward would never again receive the level of funding it had under Breasted. 
Wilson ultimately decided to cut back on all but the most vital expeditions, taking the number of 
active field commitments of the OI from twelve to three to one in the course of two years. He cut 
administrative staff and wrote, “our museum staff will be reduced, as we no longer receive 
antiquities from the field.”18 He vowed to allocate additional funds to scholarship, identifying the 
publication of results as a troubling deficiency of the OI, with “70 additional manuscripts in 
press, on hand, or definitely promised,”19 that had yet to be completed. The glut of expeditions 
during Breasted‟s directorship resulted in a large number of finds, and a number of invaluable 
additions to the institute‟s collections, but the rate of publishing had not kept pace with the rate 
of discovery and acquisition. Clay tablets sat un-translated, artifacts languished un-deciphered, 
and significant finds were unreported. Although the OI was an institution developed for the 
advancement and spread of knowledge about the ancient Near East, in the realm of publishing, 
its efforts had not kept pace with its expeditions. 
 Faced with an opportunity to shift the OI‟s research focus, Wilson laid out his priorities. 
He speculated the institution‟s members might “no longer confine ourselves strictly to the 
Orient,” but rather could look more generally at “the rise of man and his institutions.” He even 
questioned as to “whether we should be entitled to act under the name of Oriental Institute.” 
Only six months into his tenure as director, Wilson speculated that the OI would “no longer [be] 
able to concentrate on archeology,” which had been the OI‟s main mission since its inception. 
Wilson made clear, though, that the OI‟s potential shift in focus was partly an attempt to secure 
future funding, adding, “when such a question is definitely posed, we should apply to the New 
York Boards for permission to apply the funds which have been appropriated to an institution of 
slightly different character.”20 Wilson, a man with diverse personal interests, made it clear from 
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the beginning of his time as director that he would not hesitate to drastically alter the OI‟s 
specific mission of Near Eastern archeology if its general mission of humanistic interpretation 
was allowed to continue.  
Wilson did not have Breasted‟s dynamism, nor did he benefit from the same close, 
personal relationship with JDR Jr. that had served as Breasted‟s principle method of seeking 
funds, but he did put the OI on a path towards long-term viability. He also proved himself to be 
more concerned with modern happenings in the Middle East than had Breasted. Partly this 
interest grew from necessity; as a number of scholars have pointed out, nationalist leaders in the 
Middle East grew increasingly engaged with archeological activities in their countries.
21
 Such 
efforts served to both aggrandize and aggravate Western archeologists. They were aggrandized 
because their finds were often heavily promoted by leaders like the Shah in Iran, who sought to 
connect his modern right to rule to that of the ancient rulers of Persia. In connecting his reign to 
that of past emperors, the Shah employed archeological finds to bolster the connection. Those 
Western archeologists who established close relationships with the Shah enjoyed his patronage; 
those who defied his vision of the past were often ostracized.  
 But Western archeologists were frequently aggravated by the newfound regional interest 
in archeology. Whereas previously they had enjoyed a near-complete autonomy, the assertive 
leaders of the Middle East wanted to control aspects of archeological digs that had previously 
been left in Western hands. For instance, the division was a longstanding tradition in Western 
digs in the Middle East. At the end of the season, all the finds were laid out, and representatives 
of each interested party – the Western institution, and the Middle Eastern government – could 
choose what they wanted to have. It was essentially a draft for artifacts. Over time, Middle 
Eastern governments altered the terms of the division to make the terms more favorable towards 
them. This rankled Western archeologists who had grown accustomed to dictating the terms of 
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engagement and compensation. No longer were they able to remove substantial artifacts for 
display, a practice that had provided tangible evidence of an expedition‟s success, impressing 
both the general public and donors.  
In the 1920s and 1930s, Western archeology in general, and American archeology in 
particular, was premised on the acquisition and display of ancient artifacts. Developments that 
hindered access to artifacts created an existential crisis for the field. As competition grew for 
artifacts both between Western collectors, as well as those in the Middle East, prices rose. 
Archeological expeditions, already expensive, were made more expensive by the higher cost of 
artifacts, which was one of the first effects felt by the field. The second move was to actually 
restrict what could be removed from the country, with native governments increasingly asserting 
their right to keep the best objects. In other words, first the cost of artifacts became prohibitive – 
and, shortly thereafter, the removal of artifacts was actually prohibited. Western archeologists 
might still remove select finds, but most often they were items of negligible significance, 
particularly for those Westerners who had grown accustomed to picking the most illustrious 
pieces for their home institutions, and returning like conquering heroes to grandiose expeditions.  
American archeologists reacted to the new restrictions on their work. Some initiated digs 
in countries that did not have antiquities laws. However, it was not long before nearly all Middle 
Eastern countries had established stricter laws, and many archeologists realized that the 
opportunities that had long structured their field would no longer be available. Either they 
transitioned to modes of inquiry that emphasized in situ interpretation, or they left the field 
entirely. American archeology would never again reach the peaks of funding, finding, and 
founding it enjoyed during the 1920s. Yet while changing conditions for archeologists within the 
Middle East influenced a number of changes within the field, those changes did not entirely 
account for the shift of inquiry from artifacts to people facts – from archeology to area studies. 
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The changing geopolitical landscape in which American archeologists like Wilson found 
themselves during and after WWII also influenced many to focus more on the contemporary 
Middle East. 
By the time he began working for the U.S. government in 1941, Wilson had spent the 
previous six years embroiled in debates that firmly grounded him in concerns of the present. As 
director of the OI, he was constantly looking for ways to cut budgets and still maintain a 
semblance of original research, and his pragmatic outlook led him to consider adopting a more 
present-day approach. From 1941-1943, as Coordinator of Information for the OWI, he saw 
firsthand the new kinds of research that, he anticipated, would be prioritized during the postwar 
period. Wilson‟s willingness to shift directions therefore had both a positive and negative pull. 
Aware that many simplistic, chauvinist opinions about Middle Easterners were propagated 
during the war, he wanted his type of humanist scholarship to be at the forefront of any area 
studies model. Yet he also wanted his department to maintain relevance, and saw that area 
experts would be sought after in the postwar period. If funding was shifting towards 
contemporary studies, then Wilson wanted to make a gambit for it, even if it meant sacrificing 
his pursuit of his original line of inquiry. Wilson therefore understood that departmental 
relevance was not available in perpetuity, but was, rather, in a state of near-constant contestation. 
If not actively sought, it could be lost. If the winds of Middle East studies were shifting towards 
the present, Wilson wanted to hoist the sails.  
John Wilson‟s experience working for the U.S. government during WWII was 
paradigmatic of the experience many academics had during their forays into government work. 
He was transformed by it; in particular, he was thereafter more eager to seek forms of 
engagement between his scholarship and the changing political landscape of the Middle East. 
Wilson‟s reaction to government work was frustration with an eye towards reform. In other 
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words, he thought the process could be improved, but he most assuredly thought academia and 
government should be partners in trying to figure out the world. More specifically, given his 
experience with the government during WWII, he realized that government agencies would 
develop a systematic approach towards the study of the rest of the world‟s populations, whether 
trained academics joined the cause or not. As he wrote in late 1944: 
During my eighteen months of service in Washington, it became increasingly clear to me 
that the universities of this country must face a demand for regional studies, with work on 
the modern world. I was concerned that some universities should undertake regional 
work in innocence of a demand for „practical training,‟ so that world understanding might 
be based on detached rather than vocational considerations. It seemed to me inevitable 
that the social sciences would demonstrate interest in regional studies and that the 
humanities should, therefore, be emphasized in order that the studies might profit by a 
respect for language, history, and philosophy. When I presented these considerations to 
the administrative officers of the University, they asked me to return from Washington 
service and undertake a study of the problems and possibilities of regional work at this 
University.
22
 
 
Although at times he expressed disenchantment with government processes which adulterated 
humanistic work, he was convinced that such efforts would be completely misguided without the 
advice of humanities scholars like himself.  
In 1944, Wilson took action to force the OI‟s hand, proposing a new plan of 
contemporary Middle Eastern research for the OI. He reasoning was seemingly thus: 1.) Wilson 
himself had made the transition from studying ancient Egypt to making pronouncements about 
the modern region, and others could do the same; 2.) although the arrangement was not perfect, 
there were no other Americans with the intimate contacts with the Middle East; and 3.) some 
university department was going to assume this role, so it should be his. From Wilson‟s 
willingness to challenge his department‟s focus, we can extrapolate that he had a somewhat 
unconventional view of scholarly expertise – at least one that was, as we will see, out of sync 
with his colleagues. His viewpoint also revealed his faith in scholarly malleability. To Wilson, 
even if one‟s expertise in one region was of a different time period, that already-established 
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expertise gave the person an advantage in terms of knowledge about that region. For Wilson, 
familiarity could breed context. Significantly, he acknowledged that he and his colleagues would 
need additional training in order to be true experts about the modern Middle East, but he was 
confident in his and their capabilities for reform. 
In June 1944, he went to his colleagues with a proposition: to transform the OI into the 
preeminent center for the study of the contemporary Middle East. He wrote: 
This memorandum throws open for discussion several proposed changes in the Oriental 
Institute and the Department of Oriental Languages. None of the changes is sweeping. 
None of the changes can be effected without group action and consent. That is why they 
are being proposed now for consideration in advance of our reorganization at the end of 
the war…It is proposed that there be a new emphasis on interpretative studies of broad 
cultural nature… without diverting means or quality from our attack on the problems of 
the Near East, it is proposed that we welcome added workers in other fields of the Orient, 
and, most particularly, workers and projects dealing with the modern Orient.
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Wilson‟s attempt to diminish the significance of the change – “none of the changes is sweeping” 
– was likely the most difficult case he had to make. From all indications, his colleagues not only 
saw the changes as sweeping, but also as a fundamental shift in mission for the institute as a 
whole, as well as for their own research agendas in particular. Despite Wilson‟s assurance that 
there would be no “diverting means or quality,” without a significant infusion of outside funds, 
the members of the Oriental Institute could see the proposal for what it was: a wholesale change 
that would require them to develop new fields of expertise. 
 Wilson‟s ideas were ambitious and involved large-scale exchange between other regions 
and American institutions. He understood that the training of qualified educators would be a 
central conundrum in the development of regional or area studies. Writing to RF officer David 
Stevens in September 1944, he asserted: 
our present interest is a groping search for the correct academic atmosphere for regional 
work of any kind. That involves experts qualified by experience, visiting professors from 
world regions, library facilities, and the opportunity to do research in and with 
contemporary world cultures. We thus approach the problem of teaching from the 
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standpoint of the scholarly qualifications of a faculty rather than from the anticipated 
demands of the students.
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Wilson‟s vision of an area studies model that emphasized the humanities, fostered close 
collaboration with local experts, and eschewed social scientific inquiry is dramatically different 
from the way in which area studies would eventually become institutionalized in the United 
States. Seeing Wilson‟s proposal as an alternative vision for area studies demonstrates that 
regional studies could have developed differently. A number of forces large and small, inside and 
outside the university setting, contributed to making Middle East area studies what it eventually 
became.  
Wilson reported back to Stevens in January 1945 with news that the proposal had been 
resoundingly rejected. The center of the study of the modern Middle East would not, for the time 
being at least, reside at the University of Chicago‟s Oriental Institute. Wilson wrote, “you will 
undoubtedly detect a note of disappointment that I was unable to persuade my own colleagues 
that their current interests might legitimately and profitably be extended.” Wilson reported 
several reasons for the faculty‟s rejection of the proposal. Most significantly, the faculty 
members “[felt] that their current work is so important that it should receive any benefits 
forthcoming instead of suffering the competition of new activities.” Wilson understood that 
impulse, and also saw it as a force that would impede any attempts to change faculty missions 
from within: 
That is simply a normal valuation of one‟s own work. It does, however, indicate the 
formula prevailing in any group of scholars where the tendency will be to emphasize past 
and present activities rather than additions of the future. As universities are at present 
constituted, interdepartmental concerns receive less attention and weight than 
departmental concerns so that the problem of any change based on faculty initiative is 
difficult. Nevertheless, I cannot see successful change in a university unless there is 
faculty participation.
25
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Wilson was stymied by this faculty model that resisted adaptation. He realized the need for 
contemporary experts on the Middle East would be fulfilled from somewhere, and remained 
frustrated that his colleagues could not see their way to provide it. 
 Yet Wilson may have also provided an impetus for RF officers to take a more activist 
role in the promotion of area studies. Summarizing the motions passed by the Department of 
Oriental Languages and Literatures, Wilson maintained the importance of area studies, but 
acknowledged that change would not come from within the university departments themselves, 
as “this Department has stated that regional studies of contemporary cultures are a concern of the 
University at large, and not of a single nuclear department or division.” Wilson anticipated that 
other departments would react in a similar way, and lamented, “in the absence of any mechanism 
to express this concern and stimulate individual departments to new interests and activities, the 
University may have no regional program. There the matter rests at present as far as Oriental 
Studies are concerned.” The only hope was that “some agency must be designated as a catalyst, 
if (a) regional studies are a valid concern of a university, and (b) the interdepartmental stimulus 
to such studies is to be activated.” The external catalyst, Wilson implied, would be a foundation 
that would provide the financial incentive for universities to establish interdepartmental area 
studies programs. With support failing, Wilson was convinced that area studies would not get off 
the ground. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
 During the 1920s and 1930s, the principle American academic interest in the Middle East 
was expressed through archeological expeditions that sought to illuminate the history of the 
ancient world. James Henry Breasted, the founder of the Oriental Institute, used Rockefeller 
money to mount numerous expeditions to the Near East, returning to Chicago with a trove of 
artifacts. A variety of factors, including the global Depression and Middle Eastern nationalism, 
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decreased access to artifacts. The shifting interests of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. and Rockefeller 
Foundation officers also reduced the scope and scale of archeological expeditions. Studies of the 
contemporary Middle East were seen as more relevant to the RF‟s mission, as well as to the 
broader interests of the U.S. government. World War II solidified this trend, as many 
archeologists were brought into government service to formulate propaganda and policy towards 
Middle Easterners. 
 Towards the end of the war, John Wilson, Breasted‟s successor, attempted to make the OI 
the finest center for the study of the contemporary Middle East. His attempt failed due to the 
resistance of his colleagues, but his failure pointed towards the ways in which area studies would 
come to be constituted during the 1950s. The Rockefeller Foundation maintained its interest in 
the Middle East, but channeled its money instead towards Princeton University, where the 
Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures, under Philip Hitti, would benefit from 
additional funds that might have gone towards the Oriental Institute. This missed opportunity and 
subsequent shift eastward is an essential part of understanding how Middle Eastern area studies 
came into being in the United States during the early postwar period. 
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